Melissa Merritt, 

"Humour, Common Sense, and the Future of Metaphysics in the Prolegomena" 

in Kant's Prolegomena: A Critical Guide, ed. Peter Thielke. 

Cambridge University Press.  Forthcoming. 

Kant’s Prolegomena is a piece of philosophical advertising: it exists to convince the open-minded “future teacher” of metaphysics that the true critical philosophy — i.e., the Critique — provides the only viable solution to the problem of metaphysics (i.e. its failure to make any genuine progress).  To be effective, a piece of advertising needs to know its audience.  This chapter argues that Kant takes his reader to have some default sympathies for the common-sense challenge to metaphysics originating from Thomas Reid and his followers; this fact in turn explains his rhetorical strategies in the Prolegomena, particularly regarding the presentation of the problem of metaphysics.  The chapter draws attention to the importance of Shaftesbury, who, with a nod to Horace, had argued for the deployment of humour to disarm fraudulent claims to epistemic and moral authority.  Kant looks to Horace himself to poke fun at the common-sense challenge to metaphysics, and from there to indicate the general shape of the particular argumentative strategies of the Critique — that project that alone, in his view, can promise some kind of future for metaphysics. 

Melissa Merritt, 

"Mendelssohn and Kant on Virtue as a Skill"

in The Routledge Handbook of Skill and Expertise, ed. Ellen Fridland and Carlotta Pavese.  Routledge. Forthcoming. 

The idea that virtue can be profitably conceived as a certain sort of skill has a long history.  My aim is to examine a neglected episode in this history — one that focuses on the pivotal role that Moses Mendelssohn played in rehabilitating the skill model of virtue for the German rationalist tradition, and Immanuel Kant’s subsequent, yet significantly qualified, endorsement of the idea.  Mendelssohn celebrates a certain automatism in the execution of skill, and takes this feature to be instrumental in meeting an objection against perfectionist, agent-based ethics: namely, that a virtuous person would seem to act for the sake of realising his own perfection in everything that he does, thereby taking a morally inappropriate interest in his own character.  Kant rejects the automatism featured in Mendelssohn’s account, on grounds that it would make virtue mindless and unreflective.  But he does not reject the skill model of virtue wholesale.  Rather, he calls for considering how reflection can be embedded in the expression of certain kinds of skill, enabling him to endorse, and arguably adopt, the model on his own terms. 

Melissa Merritt, 

"Sublimity and Joy: Kant on the Aesthetic Constitution of Virtue"

in The Palgrave Kant Handbook, ed. Matthew C. Altman.  Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. 

This chapter argues that Kant’s aesthetic theory of the sublime has particular relevance for his ethics of virtue.  Kant contends that our readiness to revel in natural sublimity depends upon a background commitment to moral ends.  Further lessons about the emotional register of the sublime allow us to understand how Kant can plausibly contend that the temperament of virtue is both sublime and joyous at the same time. 

Melissa Merritt, 

"Kant on the Pleasures of Understanding"

in Kant on Emotion and Value, ed. Alix Cohen.  Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 

Why did Kant write the Critique of Judgment, and why did he say that his analysis of the judgment of taste — his technical term for our enjoyment of beauty — is the most important part of it? Kant claims that his analysis of taste “reveals a property of our faculty of cognition that without this analysis would have remained unknown” (CJ §8, 5:213). The clue lies in Kant’s view that while taste is an aesthetic, and non-cognitive, mode of judgment, it nevertheless involves the “free play” of cognitive capacities that is pleasurable in some way that ordinary cognitive business is not. I argue that the judgment of taste reveals a pleasure that is not usually apparent when we understand something in particular, but which is nevertheless proper to the activity of understanding as such. This matters, I suggest, because in this way the judgment of taste points to a standard of cognitive virtue.

Melissa Merritt, 

"The Moral Source of the Kantian Sublime"

in The Sublime: from Antiquity to Present, ed. Timothy Costelloe.  Cambridge University Press, 2012. 

DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511978920.005

A crucial feature of Kant's critical-period writing on the sublime is its grounding in moral psychology. Whereas in the pre-critical writings, the sublime is viewed as an inherently exhausting state of mind, in the critical-period writings it is presented as one that gains strength the more it is sustained. I account for this in terms of Kantian moral psychology, and explain that, for Kant, sound moral disposition is conceived as a sublime state of mind.

Melissa Merritt and Markos Valaris, 

"Kant and Kantian Epistemology"

in Epistemology: The Key Thinkers, ed. Stephen Hetherington.  Continuum, 2012. 

 © 2019 by Melissa Merritt

The image of Minerva is from the frontispiece of Leonhard Cochius's 1769 essay Untersuchung über die Neigungen, which won the essay prize from the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin.  The phrase SAPERE AUDE ("dare to be wise") comes from Horace (Epistles I.ii.40), and was already the de facto motto of the German Enlightenment long before Kant officially christened it such in his famous 1783 essay "What is Enlightenment?".  

Melissa McBay Merritt

Senior Lecturer, University of New South Wales

Australian Research Council Future Fellow